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THE SUPREME COURT'S SECURITIES ACT REFERENCE
FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE AN UNDERSTANDING OF
THE CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS
Poonam Puri

*

I. INTRODUCTION
In a decision released on December 22, 2011, the Supreme Court
of Canada unanimously rejected the federal government's proposed Securities Act.' Using a formalistic federalism analysis, the
court held that the proposed Securities Act as currently constituted
is unconstitutional.2 The court held that day-to-day regulation of
securities is under provincial authority, while the regulation of
systemic risk and data collection is appropriately under the federal
government's general trade and commerce power.3 The court notes
that a co-operative federalism approach is a way to establish a
national regime. 4
My reaction to the Supreme Court's decision is one of surprise
and disappointment. The decision was extremely decontextualized;
the court failed to appreciate the nature of a "market" and that it is
comprised of buyers (investors) in addition to sellers (issuers). The
court also failed recognize the fact that the Canadian capital
markets have evolved such that it is now national in character, and
no longer local or regional. In comparing this decision to other
reference cases over the last 22 years, I also reach the conclusion
that the court had the tools to find in favour of a national
securities regulator, but avoided doing so, in part, by stating that it
did it could not deal with matters of policy or politics. Despite my
*

1.
2.

3.
4.

Associate Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Co-Director
Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University. An earlier version of this
commentary was presented at "What Next for Canada? A Roundtable on
Securities Regulation in Canada" hosted by the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law and Torys LLP on January 30, 2012. 1 am grateful to Ajay Gajaria for
excellent research assistance.
Reference re: Securities Act (Can.), 2011 scc 66.
In a similar line of reasoning, the Alberta Court of Appeal and a majority of the
Quebec Court of Appeal also held the act is beyond the authority of the federal
government: Reference re: Securities Act (Canada), 2011 ABCA 77, per Slatter
J.A., C6te, Conrad, Ritter and O'Brien JJ.A., concurring; Qudbec (Procureure
gindrale) v. Canada (Procureuregin&ale), 2011 QCCA 591, per Robert C.J.A. and
per Forget, Bich and Bouchard JJ.A. (Dalphond J.A. in dissent).
Supra, footnote 1, at para. 128.
Ibid., at para. 132.
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critique of the court's decision and reasoning, I believe that a
national securities regulator is still possible and a goal worth
pursuing.
This commentary is divided into three parts. First, I critique the
decision of the court from a capital markets perspective. Second, I
put the decision in context by comparing it to other reference
decisions before the Supreme Court over the last 22 years. Third, I
discuss options moving forward for national regulation of the
Canadian capital markets in light of the Supreme Court's decision.
II. CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION FROM A
CAPITAL MARKETS PERSPECTIVE
The court's decision is highly decontextualized and it does not
demonstrate a clear understanding of the evolution and current
state of capital markets in Canada.
The court characterized Canada's central claim as follows:
"[T]he securities market has evolved from a provincial matter to a
national matter affecting the country as a whole."' On this issue,
the court held that Canada "has not shown that the securities
market has so changed that the regulation of all aspects of
securities now falls within . . . s. 91(2)."1 The court cited a lack of

evidentiary support for Canada's claim that capital markets have
been transformed since their initial establishment.
The court's statement that there was a lack of evidentiary
support is puzzling, given the evidentiary record. The court had the
benefit of expert reports by Professors Trebilcock and Milne filed
by Canada as well as the handful of expert reports on securities
regulator structure that have been produced in Canada over the
last several decades. Instead of relying on these sources, the court
held that the expert evidence confirms the local nature of Canada's
securities industry.' The court cites Suret and Carpentier's article
on issuer headquarters:'
J.M. Suret and C. Carpentier, for example, point to different focuses and
specializations from province to province (Securities Regulation in Canada:

Re-examination of Arguments in Support of a Single Securities Commission (2010), Reference Record, vol. ix, 8). Mining listings compose
approximately two thirds of the securities market in British Columbia.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Ibid., at
Ibid., at
Ibid., at
Ibid., at

9.

Ibid.

paras. 4 and 33.
para. 6 (emphasis added).
para. 116.
para. 127.
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About half of Ontario's securities market is attributable to large financial
services companies. Alberta is the dominant national market for oil and gas
and roughly a quarter of technology listings emanate from Qu6bec.

My own research for the 2003 Wise Persons Committee also
confirms that there are clusters of industry specialization across the
country.' 0 It is accurate to state that British Columbia and Ontario
host a high proportion of mining issuers, Alberta hosts a high
proportion of oil and gas issuers, and Ontario hosts a high number
of financial services issuers. However, the province in which the
issuer is headquartered determines who the primary regulator is
(and hence, where the regulatory expertise in mining, or oil and gas
are located), but not much else. The reality for many issuers is that
their investors are located throughout Canada, with nationwide or
international and gross domestic product impact." The location of
the headquarters of an issuer does not determine where the market
is and provides little explanatory benefit to understanding the
scope of the capital markets.
It is more telling that two-thirds of reporting issuers in Canada
are reporting in more than one jurisdiction, meaning that they are
raising capital in more than one jurisdiction.12 Companies with
large market caps are typically national reporting issuers. Ninetyeight percent of Canadian market capitalization is allocated to
large cap companies.1
Interestingly, only Dalphond J.A. of the Qubbec Court of
Appeal held, in dissent, that capital markets are now national in
nature.14 Dalphond J.A. states "[There is] a Canada-wide
integrated capital market, where transactions are essentially
interprovincial and international, a situation radically different
from the one that existed in 1867 or even 15 years ago."' 5
Dalphond J.A.'s dissent appears firmly rooted in the prevailing
discourse on the nature of capital markets. How is it possible that
10. See my paper on local and regional market interests for the Wise Person's
Committee: Poonam Puri, "Local and Regional Interests in the Debate on
Optimal Securities Regulatory Structure" (October 7, 2003), online: Wise
Person's Committee, <http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC_6.pdf>.
I1. Ibid.
12. Wise Person's Committee, "It's Time" (Ottawa, Department of Finance, 2003), at
p. 5, online: Wise Person's Committee, <http://www.wise averties.ca/reports/
WPC%20Final.pdf>.
13. Ibid.
14. Qudbec (Procureure gindrale) v. Canada (Procureuregindrale), supra, footnote
2, at paras. 395-545.
15. Ibid., per Dalphond JA., at para. 465.
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only Dalphond J.A. came to this conclusion that is so well
supported by the expert evidence on capital markets?
The answer to this question lies in how the issue was framed by
the court. The court framed the issue as a purely federalism
analysis where it would not delve into policy questions or political
matters. This approach results in a decision that does not
appreciate the current state of capital markets in Canada and
does not chart a clear path forward for effective securities
regulation for the benefit of all Canadians.
Ill. COMPARISON WITH OTHER REFERENCES
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
To put the court's Securities Reference decision in context, I
compared this reference decision to other reference decisions
released by the Supreme Court since 1990. Upon comparison, I
have observed that this decision is out of step with other major
reference decisions in the application of the constitutional principle
of a "living tree." In addition, the court's refusal to delve into
policy issues or political matters is in sharp contrast to other
significant reference decisions.
In the Securities Reference, the court reaches the conclusion that
the proposed Securities Act sought to regulate the day-to-day
activities of issuers and other participants in the securities market
and that court held that "[t]hese matters have long been considered
local concerns subject to provincial legislative competence over
property and civil rights."' 6 This decision essentially sends the
message that this is how we have always done it and therefore, we
are going to continue in this way. This type of reasoning is
problematic from a capital markets perspective as noted in Part II
of this commentary above; it is also out of step with the
constitutional principle of a "living tree."17
Since 1990, there have been 22 reference decisions released by
the Supreme Court of Canada. Ten of those decisions have been on
issues related to federalism. In a number of these decisions, the
court has put the relevant issue in its full social, political and
economic context and acknowledged changes in norms, practices
16. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 6.
17. An overview of the living tree doctrine of constitutional interpretation is available
in: Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. supp., vol. 1.
(Scarborough, Ont., Thomson Carswell, 2007) (updated 2011, rel. 1), at 15.9(f).
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and conventions over time. Additionally, the court has dealt with
policy issues and political matters either explicitly or implicitly.
For example, in the 2004 Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, the

Supreme Court takes an explicitly more contextual approach. In
that decision, the court outlines that marriage is not a fixed
concept in constitutional law and that it is insufficient to consider
how marriage was conceived at the time of Confederation, but
instead how it stands today.'" Under the heading "The Meaning of
Marriage Is Not Constitutionally Fixed," the court wrote:' 9
The "frozen concepts" reasoning runs contrary to one of the most
fundamental principles of Canadian constitutional interpretation: that our
Constitution is a living tree which, by way of progressive interpretation,
accommodates and addresses the realities of modem life.

In holding that the concept of marriage has changed from being
"between a man and a woman" to between two people, the court
recognized the changes in relationships in modern society. In the
Securities Reference, it appears that the court departed from
understanding the "realities of modern life." In determining that
the Canadian capital markets are local in nature, the court ignores
the reality and the evidence that, for the most part, the Canadian
market for capital is national in character and increasingly
international in nature.
The court also seeks to avoid the issue of deciding on optimal
regulation stating that the court is not deciding whether a national
securities regulator is more effective from a policy standpoint:20
[T]he policy question of whether a single national securities scheme is
preferable to multiple provincial regimes is not one for the courts to decide.
Accordingly, our answer to the reference question is dictated solely by the
text of the Constitution [and] fundamental constitutional principles ...

Whether the capital markets can be effectively regulated at the
provincial level or whether federal regulation is necessary is indeed
a policy question, but it is a policy question that requires the court
to arbitrate. In other references, the court has dealt with issues that
can only be reasonably considered to be policy issues and political
matters and the court has addressed them explicitly or implicitly.
For example, in the Secession Reference,21 the court was asked
whether Qu6bec could unilaterally separate from Canada. The
18.

Reference re: Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at paras. 21-26.

19. Ibid., at para 22.
20. Supra, footnote 1, at para. 10.
21.

Reference re: Secession of Qudbec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
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court's decision provides a clear example of addressing matters of
policy and politics. The court held that a referendum on a clear
question that confirmed a desire for Quebec sovereignty establishes
a "duty to negotiate" between the government of Qubbec, the
Government of Canada and other relevant parties. The extensive
reliance on a duty to negotiate was particularly surprising since the
concept was not argued by any of the parties.22 Creating a duty to
negotiate on the parties after a unilateral declaration of
independence, when this was not even argued by the parties, could
not be reasonably considered to be anything other than the court
engaging in a policy decision in relation to a political matter.
IV. REALISTIC OPTIONS MOVING FORWARD ON
NATIONAL REGULATION OF CAPITAL MARKETS
While earlier parts of my commentary critique the decision and
the court's reasoning, this part of the commentary focuses on next
steps and where we can reasonably go to from here. I will briefly
discuss three possible options: (i) the status quo with provincial
territorial regulation and a passport system; (ii) a national
regulator narrowly focused on systemic risk; and (iii) a national
regulator with a broad mandate achieved co-operatively with the
"willing" provinces.
The problem with the status quo is that it is ineffective. While
the Passport system achieves some efficiencies for issuers, there is
still no single voice to represent Canada internationally and no one
final decision-maker who runs the system and is accountable.
Under the current system, enforcement issues both in the
regulatory and criminal spheres continue to be problematic.
A second option would be to pursue a federal securities
regulator that focuses on systemic risk. The Supreme Court
indicated that a federal scheme aimed at systemic risk and national
Canada-wide data management would be constitutionally valid.23
This approach would require the drafting of federal legislation that
is much narrower in scope and mandate than the Securities Act
that was put before the court. In my view, this approach would
require focusing on exactly what systemic risk means and how best
to manage it. We would also need to give more thought on how
systemic risk materializes in different ways. Presumably a national
Patrick J. Monahan, "The Public Policy Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Secession Reference" (1999), 11 N.J.C.L. 65, at p. 66.
23. Reference re: Securities Act (Can.), supra, footnote 1, at paras. 117 to 121.

22.
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regulator based on systemic risk should regulate issuers, intermediaries and/or and transactions that are above a certain size,
scope or complexity and that are likely to cause concerns about
systemic risk. Would issuers in certain industries be automatically
regulated by this regulator? Would issuers above certain market
capitalizations be regulated by this regulator? Which types of
instruments and/or products would this regulator oversee? Would
the regulator articulate specific, bright-line rules which would lay
out which participants and products will be subject to its
regulation or will the regulator rely on more general but less
certain principles for the scope of its regulatory reach? My concern
with this narrow approach to federal regulation based on systemic
risk is that it would create a 14th regulator in the capital markets
and not directly address the issues of accountability, duplication,
inefficiency and ineffectiveness that cause us concern with the
current system.
Finally, the third option for a way forward would be to engage
in a co-operative federalism solution with the federal government
negotiating a mutually acceptable solution with the provinces. The
court recommends that the parties take a co-operative approach to
meeting this federalism challenge.2 4 As I understand it, this is
precisely what the federal government and the Canadian Securities
Transition Office have been doing to date, even though the
legislation before the court was more absolute about the federal
government's role in the proposed new environment. Of all the
options available after the Supreme Court's decision, I believe this
option is the best one moving forward. Even if a national securities
regulator is restricted to the federal government and the "willing
provinces," it will allow for greater accountability, actual decisionmaking authority, and more effective and efficient enforcement.
This will result in Canadian capital markets that are more
competitive, more efficient and fairer and that will better protect
investors.

24. Ibid., at para. 132.

